THE FOX INFLUENCE
COMPILATION AND COMMENTARY
BY LUCY WARNER
SEPTEMBER 9, 2018


SOME VERY FUNNY FOX FRIEND PARROTS PUTRID TRUMPIAN PROSE, OR HOW A BRANCH OF THE ONCE SACRED FREE PRESS HAS BECOME TOTALLY COOPTED TO THE TOO OFTEN INHUMANE RIGHT. THIS IS WHAT DESTROYS DEMOCRACY, DON’T YOU THINK? NOBODY CARES ABOUT DOING GOOD THINGS. IT’S A FORM OF ROOT ROT. OUR SOCIETY GROWS MORE AND MORE CORRUPT UNTIL WE STAGNATE.

http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/09/08/failed-obama-attacks-successful-trump-in-bitter-swan-song.html
OPINION 22 hours ago
Failed Obama attacks successful Trump in bitter swan song
Christian Whiton By Christian Whiton | Fox News

Former President Obama subjected students at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign to an hour-long verbal tranquilizer Friday as he attacked President Trump and stuck to his usual specialty: mendacity and self-love.

Obama started by noting that former presidents usually keep quiet about politics as a courtesy to their successors, even if they disagree with them or if the successors come from the other party. He cited George Washington as a practitioner of this custom. He could have found examples as recent as former President George W. Bush, who afforded Obama his silence.

But President Obama figured that even after an eight-year presidency, which itself followed a year-long campaign filled with lofty if conceited language, the world still needed to hear more of his words.

I was surprised how far into the speech President Obama got before accusing President Trump and other Republicans of racism, which these days is usually the first accusation out of a progressive’s mouth.

Obama was several thousand words into the speech when we got to hear the old racial-grievance-hustler we came to know so well over his eight years in the Oval Office: “And even though your generation is the most diverse in history … those are the kinds of conditions that are ripe for exploitation by politicians who have no compunction and no shame about tapping into America's dark history of racial and ethnic and religious division.”

As if that mendacious smear wasn’t clear enough for his audience, Obama made his allegation clearer still when he said that “over the past few decades, the politics of resentment and division and paranoia has unfortunately found a home in the Republican Party.”

What aren’t resentful, divisive, or paranoid are statistics. And those statistics tell us that Obama failed as a president and Trump has succeeded – both for minorities and all Americans collectively.

Economic growth during the Obama years should have been unusually high, since he took office the year after a financial collapse and stabilization. Growth is usually strongest after recessions.

But during the Obama years, economic growth averaged only around 2 percent and wages stagnated. New York Times columnist Paul Krugman and other left-wing economists invented a new term – “SECULAR STAGNATION*” – to argue that we were permanently in a new era of slow growth and there was nothing that could change the situation.

But President Trump did change the situation. Annual economic growth is now averaging about 3 percent and the last quarter saw rapid growth at an annualized rate of 4.2 percent. Wages are finally growing – some 2.9 percent over the last year, which is far better than anything achieved under Obama.

Unemployment for women and minorities is near historic lows, as it is for all Americans, and manufacturing jobs are coming back. These are facts, not opinions.

All of this comes after eight years of identity politics, political correctness and the accentuation of racial grievances by our political class. That is the true tragedy of Obama: he could have finally buried the ghosts of racial inequality in our nation. Instead, he fanned the flames of racial grievance for partisan political gain. He still does so, as do effectively all progressives.

The rest of the speech was somewhat typical for a swan song.

President Obama took credit for rapidly pulling out of Iraq, but not for the creation of ISIS that resulted.

He said he “got Iran to halt its nuclear program,” even though the since-abandoned deal he purchased from the mullahs actually sanctified Iran’s nuclear program, and left the country with the means to make the bomb.

President Obama said the Trump administration, which has sanctioned Russia, expelled Russian diplomats, and provided arms to Ukraine was “cozying up to the former head of the KGB” in Russia. But he didn’t mention that that he whispered in the 2012 to the sidekick of Russia’s strongman that “it’s important for (Vladimir Putin) to give me space. … After my election, I have more flexibility.”

The other mendacious points in the Obama speech are too numerous and boring to enumerate. The net result was a starkly partisan speech wholly inappropriate for a student audience.

Throughout it all was the bedrock theme of Obama and the self-assured and self-loving progressives of his era: a conceit that “progress doesn’t just move in a straight line” but we will all arrive at their vision of a politically ordered society one way or another.

Obama had his eight years and we know the score: economic stagnation, our enemies abroad gaining strength, and racial acrimony at home. Trump has reversed much of this in stunningly little time, which explains the particularly bitter tone of this swan song from a failed former president.

Christian Whiton was a senior advisor in the Donald Trump and George W. Bush administrations. He is a senior fellow for strategy and public diplomacy at the Center for the National Interest and the author of “Smart Power: Between Diplomacy and War.”


SEE THE BRIEF EXPLANATORY ARTICLE ON “SECULAR STAGNATION” WHICH I HAVE PLACED NEXT. CHRISTIAN WHITON, FROM OUR FIRST ARTICLE ABOVE, HAS THE HISTORY OF THE TERM WRONG, AT LEAST. I WON’T SAY HE’S INCOMPETENT. JUST A TAD TOO COCKY. IT CAUSED HIM TO MAKE A MISTAKE. I’M NOT WITHIN A MILE OF BEING AN ECONOMIST MYSELF, BUT IF THIS SELF-SATISFIED LITTLE OBAMA HATER IS GOING TO MAKE THE ARGUMENT THAT OBAMA, IF HE HAD BEEN A REAL MAN; WOULD HAVE JUMPSTARTED THE ECONOMY IMMEDIATELY FROM THE STATE OF NEAR COLLAPSE THAT IT WAS IN WHEN HE HAD TO TAKE IT OVER -- HE SHOULD AT LEAST MAKE HIS ARGUMENT RIGHT. PEOPLE HAD LOST BUSINESSES AND HOMES; AND THERE WAS VERY LITTLE FAT LEFT TO TRIM.

WHAT SHOULD MORE LIKELY BE COMPARED IS THE “COINCIDENCE” THAT AFTER A DOZEN YEARS OF REPUBLICAN TIGHTFISTEDNESS TOWARD THE NONWEALTHY 90% OF AMERICANS, THERE WAS SERIOUS INJURY DONE. 2008 WAS AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS RECESSION, AND 1929 WAS THE CALAMITOUS BEGINNING OF “THE GREAT DEPRESSION.” YOU HAVE TO FULLY RESUSCITATE THE DYING CHILD BEFORE YOU CAN EXPECT IT TO GROW. COMPARE THE SIMILAR CASE OF THE HERBERT HOOVER YEARS THAT PRECEDED THE CRASH OF 1929 AND THE NEAR DEATH OF OUR COUNTRY.

“SECULAR STAGNATION*” – THIS EXPLANATORY WRITING IS AT LEAST AS INTERESTING AS WHITON’S SPIDERY ARTICLE AGAINST OBAMA’S RIGHT TO SPEAK OUT FOR AMERICAN PRINCIPLES. HEAVEN KNOWS, SOMEBODY NEEDS TO. BESIDES, “NEW YORK TIMES COLUMNIST PAUL KRUGMAN AND OTHER LEFT-WING ECONOMISTS,” ARE NOT THE INVENTORS OF THE “NEW” TERM “SECULAR STAGNATION.” IT WAS INVENTED IN 1938 BY DEPRESSION-ERA ECONOMIST ALVIN HANSEN TO EXPLORE THE CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY TO PICK ITSELF UP BY IT’S BOOT STRAPS AND DUST ITS’ BEHIND OFF IN RECORD TIME. THE SAME THING IS TRUE OF 2008. THAT WAS NO MINOR ECONOMIC HICCUP! PEOPLE LOST MILLIONS ON THE STOCK MARKET, THEIR HOMES AND THEIR JOBS, AND BUSINESSES WENT UNDER. THE FACT IS THAT WHEN PEOPLE HAVE NO MONEY THEY CAN’T BUY ANY PRODUCTS, EVEN IF THEY DO REALLY NEED THEM. IF THEY DON’T NEED THEM, THEY WILL WISELY CHOOSE NOT TO BUY THEM. THOSE WHO WANT TO SELL, NEED TO PRODUCE SOMETHING THAT PEOPLE MUST BUY TO SURVIVE, AND THEN AFTER THAT GO TO MORE AND MORE OUTLANDISH ELECTRONIC GADGETRY, ETC., WHICH THOSE WHO CAN AFFORD IT WILL THEN BUY.

THERE’S A GREAT DEAL OF INGENUITY IN THE MANY VARIED AMERICAN PEOPLES, BUT NOT ENOUGH SERIOUSNESS AND WISDOM, MUCH LESS HONESTY. “THE MARKET,” ESPECIALLY ON THE WORLD SCALE, IS SIMPLY NOT MANAGEABLE. IT’S NOT BECAUSE OF WHAT OBAMA DID WRONG, BUT BECAUSE BOOMS AND BUSTS HAVE BEEN A BUILT-IN FACTOR IN THIS COUNTRY SINCE THE BEGINNING. NO PRESIDENT CAN DO A PERFECT JOB IN CONTROLLING THE ECONOMY.

IN FACT, WE NEED TO STOP CONSIDERING ECONOMICS TO BE A “SCIENCE” AT ALL. IT’S A GAME OF CHANCE, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF A NATION AS LARGE AND MULTIFARIOUS AS OURS IS GOING TO HAVE TO BE TWEAKED ON A FREQUENT BASIS TO REGULATE IT, FIRST HERE AND THEN THERE AS THE SITUATION CHANGES. THE WAY WE WANT TO THINK OF “THE MARKET” AS BEING SELF-REGULATING IS THE REPUBLICAN VERSION OF PIE IN THE SKY. IT’S A FANTASY. THAT’S HOW IT LOOKS TO ME, ANYWAY. TOO MUCH HORATIO ALGER PHILOSOPHY AND TOO LITTLE CARING ABOUT OUR NEIGHBOR. IN THE MIDST OF ALL THAT, THERE ARE BALANCES. WE NEED TO AIM FOR THOSE.

I HAVEN’T BEEN ABLE TO FIND MORE THAN ONE DEFINITION OF THE WORD SECULAR, ITSELF, THAT DOES NOT REFER PRIMARILY TO RELIGION, BUT THAT ONE IS INTERESTING. I FOUND THREE LOGICAL LINKS THERE. THEY ARE THE TERMS “GENERATION, SPAN OF TIME,” AND “WORLDLY” c. 1300. https://www.etymonline.com/word/secular. I BELIEVE THE IDEA OF A GENERATION OR SPAN OF TIME MAKES THE MOST SENSE, BECAUSE THOSE HIGHS AND LOWS IN ECONOMIC CYCLES GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF BEING NATURAL OR INEVITABLE. WHAT I SUSPECT MAY BE BEHIND IT IS NOT A GOVERNMENT POLICY SO MUCH AS THE INTERACTION OF BILLIONS OF FACTORS AROUND THE WORLD PRODUCING SOMETHING LIKE “THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT.” LOOK THAT UP IN WIKIPEDIA. IT’S VERY INTERESTING. IT’S A PATTERN LIKE BUTTERFLY WINGS THAT CAN APPEAR IN SOME RANDOM SETTINGS. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butterfly_effect.

AFTER THIS NEXT ARTICLE ON “SECULAR STAGNATION,” GO TO THE LAST, A SHORT ONE THAT IS ALMOST A MIRROR IMAGE OF OUR AMERICAN EXPERIENCES OF THE ROLLER COASTER RIDE OF ECONOMIC MARKETS. THAT IS CALLED THE JAPANESE CRISIS. IT SEEMS A GOOD PLACE TO STOP TO ME, ON THE SUBJECT OF WHY AND HOW THE TROUGHS OCCUR, SINCE IT DOES TIE THE STRINGS TOGETHER PRETTY WELL.

https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/081116/has-age-secular-stagnation-arrived.asp
Has the Age of Secular Stagnation Arrived?
By Sean Ross | August 11, 2016 — 11:00 AM EDT

During a speech to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Forum in late 2013, noted economist Larry Summers resuscitated the theory of secular stagnation to explain why global economic conditions remained sluggish five years after the Great Recession. Summers believed a collection of factors were making classic macroeconomic policy ineffective and that policymakers might have to accept low growth as the new normal. It's an interesting hypothesis, but Summers now admits that it was incomplete.

What Is Secular Stagnation?

Depression-era economist Alvin Hansen introduced the secular stagnation concept during a presidential address in 1938. It had been nine years since the stock market crash in 1929, and Hansen argued the economy would keep on struggling because there was not sufficient investment demand to sustain future economic growth. After all, Hansen pointed out, the United States had run out of land to grab and the flow of immigrant labor had slowed. People didn't want enough products, so companies stopped investing to produce them.

Hansen's argument is similar to Summers's contention. In a 2015 address at Princeton University, Summers quoted Hansen about the “sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on themselves” during secular stagnation. Summers believes low population growth, technical automation and many other factors are preventing actual economic growth from reaching its long-term potential growth rate. These factors are sometimes called "structural headwinds" in the finance or economic community.

One critical aspect is that normal economic policy becomes ineffective. This is similar to the concept of a liquidity trap, when private businesses and investors stop responding to low interest rates. It is common for believers in secular stagnation theory to expect increased public investments and deficit spending to help close the potential output gap.

The Age of Secular Stagnation

Summers points to the collapse in private domestic capital expenditures in the United States since 2008, which left the American economy with little real growth in capital stock. He takes this to mean the economy has run short of attractive business investments, even when interest rates are historically low for years on end. He believes that automation has replaced many jobs without producing enough real income growth to create new demand. Similarly, major technology companies are able to produce enormous cash flow without requiring huge debt issuances or capital expenditures.

These factors, among several others, lead Summers to believe that "even zero policy interest rates are not enough to restore full employment." He points to similar episodes in Japan and continental Europe as proof that this phenomenon may become more pervasive over time.

One of the issues that Summers faces is that secular stagnation theory relies on two different unexplained deficiencies. First, the private economy appears to produce a tendency for underconsumption or underinvestment. Second, macroeconomic policies suddenly stop working when those private tendencies become powerful enough.

There Might Be Better Explanations

However, reduced private expenditures may not necessarily be blamed entirely on a lack of investment opportunities. A competing explanation, sometimes called "regime uncertainty," is that unprecedented and drastic economic policies make businesses and investors more conservative with their money. In other words, an investor's risk-adjusted discount rate increases along with regime uncertainty.

The regime uncertainty hypothesis appears to fit the historical evidence at least as well as the secular stagnation theory. Consider the years between 1929 and 1938, when the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations unleashed unprecedented wage and price controls, tariffs, immigration restrictions and enormous public works projects, all while fascism and communism rose in the East.

Fast forward to the years between 2008 and 2016. The U.S. government ran up four consecutive years of trillion-dollar deficits between 2009 and 2012. The Federal Reserve cut interest rates to zero for the first time and launched round after round of quantitative easing (QE). Massive new controls and regulations were implemented in health care and financial markets. It is easy to see why retail and institutional investors might be uncomfortable deploying capital in such an environment.

Lastly, Summers does not touch upon a common thread between the Great Depression, the Japanese crisis* of the 1990s and the present global stagnation. Each of these issues was preceded by a boom fueled by uncommonly low interest rates and money supply growth, and each was responded to by years and years of fiscal and monetary stimulus.

As a macroeconomic scientist, it might be tempting to look at unexpected results and list all the factors that might have caused your model not to work. The simpler, and maybe better, interpretation is that the model might not work.



JAPANESE CRISIS*--
https://www.thebalance.com/japan-s-lost-decade-brief-history-and-lessons-1979056
Japan's Lost Decade: Brief History and Lessons
What Japan's Lost Decade Could Teach Us About Financial Crises
Japan Scenics
•••
BY JUSTIN KUEPPER Updated August 17, 2018

Japan's economy was the envy of the world before succumbing to one of the longest running economic crises in history. In the 1970s, Japan produced the world's second-largest gross national product (GNP) after the United States and, by the late 1980s, ranked first in GNP per capita worldwide. But all of that ended in the early 1990s when its economy stalled, plunging the economy into what has been termed the lost decade.

What Caused Japan's Lost Decade?

Most economic crises immediately follow an economic boom where valuations disconnect from reality. For example, the dot-com bust and the Great Recession in the United States immediately followed record U.S. stock market valuations.

Similarly, Japan's lost decade was largely caused by speculation during a boom cycle. Record-low interest rates fueled stock market and real estate speculation that sent valuations soaring throughout the 1980s. Property and public company valuations more than tripled to the point where a three square meter area near the Imperial Palace was sold for $600,000.

Upon realizing that the bubble was unsustainable, Japan's Finance Ministry raised interest rates to try and stem the speculation. The move quickly led to a stock market crash and debt crisis, as borrowers failed to make payments on many debts that were backed by speculative assets. Finally, the issues manifested themselves in a banking crisis that led to consolidation and several government bailouts.

Japan's Lost Decade in Detail

After the initial economic shock, Japan's economy was sent into its now infamous lost decade, where economic expansion halted for more than 10 years. The country experienced low growth and deflation during this time, while its stock markets hovered near record lows and its property market never fully returned to its pre-boom levels.

Economist Paul Krugman blames the lost decade on consumers and companies that saved too much and caused the economy to slow. Other economists blame the country's aging population demographic or its monetary policy—or both—for the decline. In particular, the slow response of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to intervene in the marketplace may have exacerbated the problem. The reality is that many of these factors may have contributed to the lost decade.

Following the crisis, many Japanese citizens responded by saving more and spending less, which had a negative impact on aggregate demand. This contributed to deflationary pressures that encouraged consumers to further hoard money, which resulted in a deflationary spiral.

Japan's Lost Decade vs. the 2008 U.S. Crisis

Many economists and financial experts have compared Japan's lost decade to the U.S. situation after the 2008 banking crisis. In both cases, speculation fueled real estate and stock market bubbles that eventually crashed and led to government bailouts. Both economies also responded by promising to increase fiscal spending to combat deflation.

Their period between 2000 and 2009 in the U.S. has also been called a lost decade on occasion since two deep recessions at the beginning and end of the period resulted in a net-zero gain for many households. Steep declines in real estate values and the stock market resulted in significant losses, including the S&P 500's worst ever 10-year performance with a -9.1% total return.

Despite the similarities, there are also some important differences between the two situations. Japan's aging population was a major contributor to its woes, while the U.S. maintains relatively positive demographics with plenty of young workers entering the workforce. The U.S. Federal Reserve has also been much quicker to act than the Bank of Japan.

Lessons Learned From Japan's Lost Decade

Japan's lost decade has provided many valuable economic lessons. Some economists argue against any interventions on the part of central banks, contending that they inevitably lead to moral hazard and longer-term problems. But others argue that interventions should take the market by surprise in terms of timing and scope.

Some key lessons are as follows:

Act quickly to stem the crisis. The Bank of Japan's reluctance to act quickly caused a crisis of confidence among investors and may have exacerbated its problems.

Spending isn't the answer. Japan's attempts to spend on public works projects wasn't particularly successful in helping it recover more quickly from its economic woes.

Counteract demographics. Japan's reluctance to substantially raise its retirement age or taxes only helped to further its demographic problems.

Don't rack up debt. Japan's massive levels of debt were ultimately responsible for its crisis and the lost decade, and the BOJ was behind the curve in raising interest rates.

Key Takeaway Points

Japan's lost decade was likely caused by rampant speculation during an economic boom that led to a debt crisis and long-term deflation after the bubble burst.
The lost decade resembles the 2008 U.S. financial crisis in many ways, but some differences are important to consider.

Many different lessons can be learned from Japan's lost decade, ranging from the underlying causes to potential solutions.