FA AND ANTIFA IN PORTLAND OREGON
THIS FIGHTING HAPPENED TODAY, JULY 1, 2018
COMPILATION AND COMMENTARY
BY LUCY WARNER


WHITE NATIONALISTS HAVE BEEN FOCUSING ON PORTLAND OREGON AS THE CAPITAL OF THEIR PROPOSED “WHITE NATION.” THERE WILL PROBABLY BE MORE OF THIS STREET WARFARE. THEY WANT TO SPLIT OFF A SEGMENT OF THE COUNTRY AS THEIRS, FOR THEIR ANTI-EVERYBODY PHILOSOPHY TO FLOURISH, AND I PRESUME, FOR AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS TO BE SUSPENDED. I WISH I COULD SAY THAT THEY HAVE A PERFECT RIGHT TO TRY TO BREAK THIS COUNTRY APART AND MISTREAT OR PERHAPS KILL ALL OF US “LIBERALS” WHO DISAGREE. IT’S TIME TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION TO PROHIBIT THIS KIND OF THING. FREEDOM FOR ONE SHOULD NOT OBLITERATE THE FREEDOM OF OTHERS.

VIDEO ONLY
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2018/jul/01/far-right-marchers-clash-with-anti-fascists-in-portland-video
Portland
Far-right marchers clash with anti-fascists in Portland – video
A riot was declared in downtown Portland, Oregon on Saturday evening, as the city's worst protest violence of the Trump era erupted.

More than 150 supporters of the far-right Patriot Prayer group fought with scores of anti-fascist protesters. Nine people were arrested

Riot in Portland as far-right marchers clash with anti-fascists
Source: Reuters/Bryan Colombo
Sun 1 Jul 2018 07.08 EDT



THERE WAS AN ARTICLE ABOUT THREE OR FOUR MONTHS AGO ON HOW IDYLLIC PORTLAND OREGON IS. I GUESS THE FASCISTS THINK SO, TOO, AND HAVE DECIDED TO TAKE OVER. I DO HOPE AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE WILL BE PUT UP AGAINST THESE PEOPLE. SEE THE OTHER ARTICLES ON THE SUBJECT BELOW. THEY ARE OBVIOUSLY PLANNING THEIR TAKEOVER SOONER THAN I HOPED.

https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2018/04/oregon_state_bars_statement_on.html
PORTLAND NEWS
Oregon State Bar's statement on 'white nationalism' draws criticism
Updated Apr 24, 2018; Posted Apr 23, 2018
By Maxine Bernstein mbernstein@oregonian.com
The Oregonian/OregonLive

SEE: PDF OF OREGON BAR AND OREGON SPECIALTY BAR STATEMENTS

The Oregon State Bar's recent bulletin had these back-to-back pages displayed. On the left is the bar's , "Statement on White Nationalism and Normalization of Violence.'' On the right, is a separate but related "Joint Statement of the Oregon Specialty Bar Associations'' that supports the state bar's statement. (Screenshot )

Two signed statements in the latest Oregon State Bar bulletin – one by the bar condemning speech that incites violence and the other by non-bar specialty groups decrying the rise of the white nationalist movement under President Trump -- have drawn fire from some lawyers aghast that the bar would allow such political statements.

The bar has received requests from six lawyers who requested refunds of their dues, and has granted one partial refund so far, said spokeswoman Kateri Walsh. The bar stands by its own statement, but the refund will respond to the second statement that wasn't approved by state bar leadership, she said.

A "Statement on White Nationalism and Normalization of Violence" denounces hate mongering, referencing the white nationalist march last August in Charlottesville, Virginia, and the May stabbing attacks on the Portland MAX train. The bar's statement calls out a "current climate of violence, extremism and exclusion" that threatens the rule of law and judicial system that serves everyone.

That statement was signed by the president and president-elect of the bar's board of governors, a board member, the bar's chief executive officer, a state bar staff member and a volunteer lawyer who leads the bar's diversity and inclusion committee.

An adjoining page has a "Joint Statement of the Oregon Specialty Bar Associations Supporting the Oregon State Bar's Statement.'' It goes further, repeatedly criticizing President Donald Trump for having "catered to this white nationalist movement, allowing it to make up the base of his support and providing it a false sense of legitimacy."

Leaders of the Oregon Asian Pacific American Bar Association, Oregon Filipino American Lawyers Association, Oregon chapter of the National Bar Association, Oregon Hispanic Bar Association, Oregon Women Lawyers, OGALLA-The LGBT Bar Association of Oregon and Oregon Minority Lawyers Association signed the supporting statement.

Document: The Oregon State Bar Bulletin's pages

West Linn lawyer Diane Gruber slammed the statements as "blatantly partisan" and in clear violation of a 1990 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Keller v. State Bar of California, which held that attorneys required to be members of a state bar association have a First Amendment right to refrain from subsidizing the organization's political or ideological activities.

The Oregon State Bar is a government agency that regulates the legal profession in the state. It publishes a bulletin, a magazine that is mailed to members 10 times a year.

Lake Oswego lawyer Shawn Lindsay, who identified himself as a Republican but not a Trump supporter, said he felt the bar "grossly violated" the Keller ruling.

He wrote to the bar that he supports the first statement's "underlying message'' of "fair and equitable administration/equal justice for all,'' but added, "you and the other signers went far beyond that by making it biased and political.''

"You and the other signers have the right to educate and make statements, but you should do so by presenting impartial information and unbiased statements," he wrote. "You did not do so."

Several demanded that the bar print a retraction.

"I am distressed to learn that my bar dues are being used to promote a left-wing agenda," wrote Darcia Krause, another Portland lawyer.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Greg Nyhus wrote that he was disappointed to learn his dues were "used to promote a political and partisan letter – directed at hate speech but clearly intended to suppress other viewpoints."

Dues range from $465 to $552, depending on when a lawyer was admitted to the bar.

The Multnomah County Republican Party also sent the bar a letter, demanding that it "cease its partisan attacks against Trump.''

"The bar has no business taking its members' dues money to publish false claims that fringe racist groups constitute the 'base' of the president's support," wrote lawyer James Buchal, a member of the bar and chairman of the county GOP.

Other bar members supported the statements.

Portland attorney Eric E. Meyer, for example, applauded the bulletin for publishing a "strong statement against white nationalism" and said it's crucial for all attorneys as "guardians of justice" never to be "silent in the face of racism and hatred.''

At a meeting of the bar's board of governors Friday, bar chief executive officer Helen Hierschbiel noted that the board didn't formally adopt or support the statement by the specialty bar groups and said publication of the statements side-by-side was "ill-advised and confusing."

The board voted to rescind partial dues of angered members, resulting from the publication of the specialty bar statement. The board also voted to run a clarification in its next issue, affirming the state bar's statement, but explaining that the other statement was independent.

The bar also is re-examining the "editorial function'' of the bar's bulletin, she said.

-- Maxine Bernstein

mbernstein@oregonian.com
503-221-8212
@maxoregonian



THE ALT-RIGHT AND COLLEGE CAMPUSES GO TOGETHER, IF YOUTH ARE ESPECIALLY PRONE TO RADICAL AND VIOLENT ACTION GROUPS. IN THE 1970S THEY WERE LEFTIST, BUT WHATEVER THEY BELIEVE, IT IS LIKELY TO BE A PASSIONATELY HELD VIEW.

THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THEY WANT TO DESTROY THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAW AND ETHICS AND REPLACE THEM WITH AN ANTIHUMANITARIAN ONE. FOR THOSE AMERICANS WHO VIEW THAT STANCE AS BEING COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR RELIGIOUS OPINIONS, I ONLY HOPE THAT YOU WILL COME TO REALIZE THAT A HATE BASED VIEW WILL NOT SERVE YOUR POSITION IN THE END.

JUST SIX OR EIGHT MONTHS AGO MILO YIANNOPOULIS TURNED UP FOR A SPEECH ON CAMPUS, AND WAS CONFRONTED BY AN ANTIFA GROUP AND STUDENTS OPPOSED TO HIS MESSAGE OF HATRED. ONE ARTICLE SAID THAT HE CRIED. SOMEHOW, I DOUBT THAT IT MEANS HE HAS REPENTED; BUT ONLY THAT HE WAS STOPPED IN WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO DO.

Milo Yiannopoulos
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Milo Yiannopoulos (/jəˈnɒpələs/;[1] born Milo Hanrahan; 18 October 1984; also writing under the pen name Milo Andreas Wagner)[2][3] is a British polemicist, political commentator, public speaker, and writer. Yiannopoulos is a former senior editor for Breitbart News, who describes himself as a "cultural libertarian".[4] He is a critic of Islam, atheism, feminism, social justice, political correctness, and other movements.[5]

Much of the work at Breitbart which brought Yiannopoulos to national attention was inspired by the ideas of neo-Nazis and white nationalists. In October 2017, leaked emails revealed that Yiannopoulos had repeatedly solicited neo-Nazi and white supremacist figures on the alt-right for feedback and story ideas in his work for the website Breitbart. The leaked emails also showed that his book, Dangerous, and many of his Breitbart articles were ghost-written by a Breitbart colleague.[6]

Yiannopoulos was born and raised in Kent. After being expelled from Simon Langton Grammar School for Boys, he studied at the University of Manchester and Wolfson College, Cambridge, but failed to gain a degree from either. He began working in technology journalism for The Telegraph before co-running The Kernel, an online magazine, which was devoted to technology journalism, in 2011–13. He was one of the first journalists to cover the Gamergate controversy. In 2015 he began work at Breitbart, attracting attention for his opinions and the company's association with the alt-right. He relocated to the United States, where he became a vocal supporter of Donald Trump presidential campaign, 2016. In July 2016 he was permanently banned from Twitter for what the company cited as "inciting or engaging in the targeted abuse or harassment of others", referring to a harassment campaign against actor Leslie Jones and others.[7]

Yiannopoulos has been accused of being an apologist for or supporting paedophilia, a charge he strenuously denies. The charge arises from a video clip in which he said that sexual relationships between 13-year-old boys and adult men and women can be "perfectly consensual" and positive experiences for the boys.[8] Following the release of the tape, Yiannopoulos was forced out of his position at Breitbart, and lost a contract to publish his autobiography with Simon & Schuster. Yiannopoulos has denied that he is a supporter of paedophilic relationships and claimed that his statements that ostensibly support them were merely attempts to cope with his own past victimhood, as an object of child abuse by unnamed older men.



YIANNOPOLOUS – THE CROWN PRINCE OF THE NEO-NAZI CROWD.

WASHINGTONEXAMINER.COM IS A CENTER RIGHT WEB MAGAZINE WITH OPENLY BIASED STORY CONTENT, BUT MOSTLY ACCURATE INFORMATION, ACCORDING TO FACTCHECKER. RATIONAL WIKI IS LESS KIND TO THOSE FAR RIGHTIES, THOUGH. https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Washington_Examiner

The Washington Examiner is a right-wing political journal that is heavy on psychological projection and denialism. It could be thought of as Townhall.com's more "respectable" cousin but even then, the site looks like a tabloid desperately trying to pass itself off as real news. It's not uncommon to see it used as a source among more extreme right-wingers who seem to like how proper the site pretends to be.

On science issues the site is pretty abysmal. Global warming denialism is rampant,[1] as is myths about DDT bans and other anti-environmentalist rhetoric,[2] leading to the site having a weird obsession with defending coal as being not all that damaging to the environment.[3] Also, Barack Obama only beat Mitt Romney because of the damned liberal media,[4] with implementing socialism being part of Obama's (and liberals) master plan.[5][6] Basically the site is what you'd expect from a publication that makes most of its money from winding up wingnuts.


LOOK LEFT? NO. LOOK AT YOURSELF IN THE MIRROR!

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/looking-for-fascism-in-america-look-left-on-campus
Protestors against a scheduled speaking appearance by polarizing Breitbart News editor Milo Yiannopoulos fill Sproul Plaza on the University of California at Berkeley campus on Feb. 1, in Berkeley, Calif. The event was canceled out of safety concerns after protesters hurled smoke bombs, broke windows and started a bonfire. (AP Photo/Ben Margot)
Ben Margot

Projection is the psychological term for imagining that others possess faults which are actually your own. Case in point: those liberal predictions that after Donald Trump lost the election, violent Trump supporters would attack innocent people, especially members of minority groups. Visions of storm troopers danced in their heads. Vast mobs of white-hooded Ku Klux Klanners would terrify the countryside. Brownshirts and Blackshirts would infest the city streets.

Something like that is happening now — but the violence is coming from leftists, not Trumpists. Take the University of California, Berkeley, [long pause] please. That's where a speech to the Young Republicans by rightist provocateur Milo Yiannopoulos was shut down by a screaming mob on February 1, as this eyewitness account from Power Line's Steven Hayward records. Not only was the speech shut down, but gangs of ski-masked and bandana-wearing protesters roamed the streets just off campus with sledgehammers, smashing ATM machines. In one instance, Hayward reports, a 62-year-old Republican who voted for Hillary Clinton held up a sign reading "1st Amendment Protects All Speech" and, on the obverse side, "Even Milo's" was punched in the nose and dropped to the ground.

. . . .

It also made an appearance in Middlebury College in Middlebury, Vermont, (73 percent Clinton, 16 percent Trump) when my American Enterprise Institute colleague Charles Murray appeared in response to an invitation from political science Professor Allison Stanger to speak to students Thursday. Here is Murray's account of how he was shouted down by protesters, how in line with previous arrangements he went to speak in another room where his talk could be livestreamed.

The liberals who have been quaking in fear of Trumpists thugs might want to notice where the real violent thuggery is occurring and which side of the political spectrum is tolerating it. They're guilty of projection.

One final note: the Associated Press ran a story about the response to Murray's speech in Middlebury that twice in its first three paragraphs repeated characterizations of him as a "white nationalist." The Washington Post, to its shame, printed the story unchanged. This is a disgraceful libel, as anyone who knows Murray's work or knows him personally knows very well. The AP writer and the Post editor who passed the story along relied for their second characterization on the Southern Poverty Law Center — a dicey source as Harry Zieve Cohen of The American Interest and Charlotte Allen in The Weekly Standard make clear. Washington Post executive editor Marty Baron, if he still wishes to claim the mantle of an objective journalist, should find out how this vile slur got into his paper and make an appropriate disclosure and apology.


MURRAY IS THE AUTHOR OF THE BELL CURVE, A SUPPOSEDLY SCHOLARLY WORK ON IQS GROUPED BY RACE, IN WHICH BLACK PEOPLE WERE GRADED AS BEING OF LOWER INTELLIGENCE. THAT IS WHY SO MANY PEOPLE CONFRONTED HIM IN A THREATENING MANNER. HE ESPOUSES A WHITE SUPREMACIST VIEW, AND HAS BEEN PROPAGATING THOSE RACIST ARGUMENTS FOR MANY YEARS. WHAT COULD BE THE UNIVERSITY’S PURPOSE IN ASKING HIM TO SPEAK ON THEIR CAMPUS?

https://www.amren.com/news/2013/05/in-defense-of-jason-richwine-and-charles-murray/
In Defense of Jason Richwine and Charles Murray
Michael Barone, Washington Examiner, May 16, 2013

My American Enterprise Institute colleague Charles Murray came to the defense of our former colleague Jason Richwine, who resigned from the Heritage Foundation amid protests about his Harvard Ph.D. thesis, on nationalreview.com. Charles was entirely accurate in stating that Richwine’s conclusion that Hispanics have lower-than-average IQs is accurate and, among specialists in this area, non-controversial. Richwine was careful to say that the average Hispanic IQ might rise over time, as has been observed of other groups’ average IQs.

ON THE ECONOMIST BLOG A WRITER IDENTIFIED AS W.W. defends the stigmatization of Richwine. He states blandly that “racism has always been predicated on falsification hypotheses about racial inferiority.” I think this is just plain wrong factually: Many people have hated Jews and Asians on the grounds that they tend to be unfairly superior in certain respects, including intelligence. But there’s something more wrong with this line of thinking. It assumes that if ordinary people get the idea that one group on average scores worse on intelligence tests then they will conclude that it’s justified to discriminate against all members of the group. Ordinary people—or at least ordinary Americans—know better than that. They have learned, from school, from work, from everyday life, that there is wider variation within each measured group than between measured groups. Some members of a racially or ethnically defined group that on average scores low on IQ tests score far above average. And some members of a group that on average scores high will score far below average.

So the fact that there are differences in average IQ scores between members of different groups does not undercut the case against group discrimination. But it does undercut the case for racial quotas and preferences and for the “disparate impact”* legal doctrine which amounts to the same thing. Those cases depend on the assumption that in a fair society we would find the same racial mix in every school, every occupation and every neighborhood. Ordinary people know that isn’t true, but the elites who cherish “affirmative action” want people to believe it is. This is why there was such a furiously negative reaction to Murray and Richard Herrnstein’s 1994 book “The Bell Curve,” which patiently explained that intelligence is partly the result of genetics and partly the result of environment: Both nature and nurture play a role. I made points very similar to those here when I wrote this for National Review in December 1994.

Original Article

TOPICS: Race and Intelligence, Racial Differences, Racial Preferences in Education, Racial Preferences in Hiring, Science and Genetics


DISPARATE IMPACT*
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/disparate-impact.html
disparate impact

Adverse effect of a practice or standard that is neutral and non-discriminatory in its intention but, nonetheless, disproportionately affects individuals having a disability or belonging to a particular group based on their age, ethnicity, race, or sex.


RICHWINE’S UNACCEPTABLE HARVARD DISSERTATION

https://thinkprogress.org/the-inside-story-of-the-harvard-dissertation-that-became-too-racist-for-heritage-3a14238f662e/
The Inside Story Of The Harvard Dissertation That Became Too Racist For Heritage
ZACK BEAUCHAMP
MAY 22, 2013, 1:00 PM

The idea that some racial groups are, on average, smarter than others is without a doubt among the most discussed (and debunked) “taboos” in American intellectual history. It is an argument that has been advanced since the days of slavery, one that helped push through the draconian Immigration Act of 1924, and one that set off a scientific firestorm in the late 60s that’s hardly flagged since.

Yet every time the race and IQ hypothesis reclaims the public spotlight, we are caught slackjaw, always returning to the same basic debates on the same basic concepts.

The recent fracas sparked by Dr. Jason Richwine’s doctoral dissertation is a case in point. The paper is a dry thing, written for an academic audience, yet its core claim, that Latino immigrants to the United States are and will likely remain less intelligent than “native whites,” has proved proper tinder for a public firestorm. The Heritage Foundation’s Senior Policy Analyst in Empirical Studies is now a former Senior Policy Analyst — Heritage could not risk further tainting an immigration report it hoped would be influential by outright defending its scholar’s meditations on the possibly genetic intellectual inferiority of immigrants from Latin America.

It might seem like the book is closed on l’affaire Richwine: he’s left his job, Heritage is left with a black eye, and not a single mind has been changed about the value of research into race and IQ. But there’s still one major unanswered question.

If the dissertation was bad enough to get him fired from the Heritage Foundation, how did it earn him a degree from Harvard?

A popular answer among Richwine’s defenders is that, quite simply, it was exemplary work. Richwine’s dissertation committee was made up, by all accounts, of three eminent scholars, each widely respected in their respective fields. And it is Harvard.

But dozens of interviews with subject matter experts, Harvard graduates in Richwine’s program who overlapped with him, and members of the committee itself paint a somewhat more textured picture. Richwine’s dissertation was sloppy scholarship, relying on statistical sophistication to hide some serious conceptual errors. Yet internal accounts of Richwine’s time at Harvard suggests the august university, for the most part, let serious problems in Richwine’s research fall through the cracks.

Richwine Goes To Harvard
By his own account, Jason Richwine came to the Harvard Kennedy School deeply fascinated with the link between race and IQ. Richwine told The Washington Examiner’s Byron York that, as an undergraduate at American University, he fell in love with Charles Murray’s work on the topic. Murray, who will become an important player in Richwine’s story later on, is one of the authors of the infamous The Bell Curve, the 1994 book whose claims about the genetic roots of the black/white IQ gap set off the most famous public food fight over race and IQ. Richwine describes Murray as “my childhood hero.”

People that knew Richwine at Harvard describe him as an introverted, but kind, man. “He was a quiet and thoughtful person,” said Anh Ngoc Tran, a contemporary of Richwine’s at Harvard who now teaches at Indiana University. “[Richwine] was friendlier to international students,” Tran said. Another contemporary of Richwine’s echoed Tran, saying Richwine was “not really all that outgoing. Always a really nice guy.”

Tran took pain to distance Richwine from accusations of racism. “I don’t think he is racist,” Tran told me. “His wife is an immigrant.”

After the first two years of coursework, PhD candidates in Public Policy at the Kennedy School move away from group classes toward individual research. That means taking comprehensive exams (“comps,” in grad student lingo) to show you’ve mastered the course material. After comps, you start work on a dissertation, a piece of original scholarship that’s supposed to demonstrate the candidate’s ability to produce research at the level expected of an expert in the field. Dissertation topics are determined in conjunction with a primary advisor, who goes on to become the “chair” of a three-person committee that determines the candidate’s fate. The topic is finalized in a formal “prospectus” outlining the research agenda.

Richwine’s chair, as listed in his dissertation, was Professor George Borjas, a prominent, if controversial, economist. A Cuban immigrant himself, Borjas was a natural fit for Richwine’s dour assessment of mass Latino immigration: he’s the nation’s leading academic immigration skeptic, famous (or infamous, depending on your point of view) for arguing that immigrants to the United States are likely to be unskilled drags on the US economy. One of his most influential articles, a 1987 paper called “Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants,” argued that countries with more income inequality than the United States are likely to send over “low quality” immigrants — meaning people lacking the skills to march up the economic ladder — as unskilled laborers lead a more prosperous life here than in their home countries.

However much Borjas emphasized the skills, or lack thereof, of Latino immigrants in his own work, he knew and cared little about their IQs. “I have never worked on anything even remotely related to IQ, so don’t really know what to think about the relation between IQ, immigration,” he told Slate’s Dave Weigel. “In fact, as I know I told Jason early on since I’ve long believed this, I don’t find the IQ academic work all that interesting.”

It’s then perhaps odd that Borjas put up little resistance to Richwine’s proposed line of inquiry. “Jason had the topic fully formed in his mind before he talked to me,” he wrote via email. “I played no role in topic selection or forming the research agenda.”

This line raised eyebrows among some scholars familiar with social science dissertations. Dan Drezner is a Professor of International Politics at Tufts’ Fletcher School, an institution that’s somewhat similar to Harvard’s Kennedy School in character, who’s been following the Richwine case closely. “If I’m an advisor, and I have a student that comes to me,” Drezner said, “the last thing I would do is say ‘write this.’” They key issue is “how well formed was Richwine’s argument when he came to Borjas?” Students should come up with their own dissertation topics, Drezner said, but if an advisor didn’t sufficiently challenge them on whether it was a good, well-thought out program, that could be a problem.

What’s a “Hispanic?”
Some experts in the fields Richwine’s dissertation covered, judging from the final product, had harsh answers to Drezner’s question. “The committee was wrong to approve [Richwine’s dissertation] and to accept the prospectus,” wrote Diego A. von Vacano. Von Vacano is a professor at Texas A&M University whose research focuses on Hispanic identity. After he wrote a harsh review of Richwine’s work on the academic blog The Monkey Cage, I got in touch with him to see if he could clarify the nature of his objections.

Von Vacano’s basic critique centers on Richwine’s definitions, or lack thereof, of the terms “Hispanic,” “white,” and “race.” The most grevious of Richwine’s errors lies in his account of the first: the lack of a meaningful definition of “Hispanic” dooms the dissertation’s ability to draw rigorous conclusions about the people he’s chosen to study.

There’s enormous debate about just what “Hispanic” means and who counts as one in any meaningful sense. Richwine’s third chapter, titled “Hispanic IQ,” treats this debate in the most cursory of fashions. This is the chapter’s full definition of the term Hispanic and defense of its use:

Over 56% of immigrants living in the U.S. in 2006 were Hispanic — that is, born in either Mexico (32% of total immigrants), Central American [sic] and the Caribbean (17%), or South America (7%)…Hispanics are not a monolithic group either ethnically or culturally, but the category still has real meaning. Hispanics can be of any race, but they are most often “Mestizo” — a mixture of European and Amerindian background. Mexico, for example, is 60% Mestizo (LV 2006, 241). Hispanics also share ethno-cultural tendencies that are different from the majority Anglo-Protestant culture of the United States (Huntington 2004, 253–255). Most come from Spanish-speaking nations with cultures heavily influence by Catholicism. And many Hispanics choose to identify themselves as such, as the existence of groups like the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the National Council of La Raza (“the race” or “the people”), and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus readily demonstrates.

Von Vacano sees this as fatally inadequate. “Any serious work at the doctoral level on these issues (even if mainly quantitative or policy-oriented),” he told me, “requires a substantive component of analysis from the qualitative, historical, cultural, normative, and theoretical perspectives (at least one or two dissertation chapters).”

These are not merely scholarly niceties: what Richwine means by “Hispanic” is critical to the success of both of his two core arguments. First, to prove that “from the perspective of Americans alive today, the low average IQ of Hispanics is effectively permanent,” he needs to show that one can speak meaningfully about“Hispanic” IQ. Richwine needs this claim to be true for the entire third section of his dissertation, the one that spells out the dangers of low IQ Hispanic immigration, to succeed. Establishing the negative consequences of Hispanic immigration means first establishing there’s such a thing as “Hispanic immigration” in a scientifically useful sense.

Because Hispanic identity is so hotly contested among scholars of race and ethnicity, that means both providing a clear account of why people from an arbitrary set of geographic locations are homogenous enough for generalizations about them are meaningful, controlled social science. Richwine fails to do so.

First, Richwine asserts Hispanics are mostly some “Mestizo” mix of Native American and European, making them genetically similar. But in the unnerving world of race and IQ research, what mix they are matters. Richwine believes that “socioeconomic hierarchies correlate consistently with race all across the world” because some races are biologically smarter; “there are no countries,” he writes, “in which ethnic Chinese are less successful than Amerindians.” It stands to reason, on his theory, that “mixed” Hispanics with more European or Asian DNA will be concomitantly smarter, on average, than more heavily Amerindian or African ones. But Richwine doesn’t attempt to show that the mix of racial DNA inside any one “Hispanic” subgroup is consistent enough for generalization, let alone the category as a whole.

That’s because it’s not. Even a cursory examination of research on Latin American genetics uncovers an impossibly complex genetic admixture, one that varies widely from country to country or even region to region. To take one simple example, the average percentage of identifiably African, Native American, and European DNA among Brazilians varies widely by region (although some definitions of “Hispanic” would exclude Portuguese-speaking Brazil, Richwine’s includes it). Hispanic immigrants to the United States come from a bewildering array of countries, each with its own particular internal diversity. As von Vacano puts it, “there is no literature that can meaningfully support the idea that ‘Hispanic’ is a genetic category,” let alone one that can be equated with the colonially-superimposed “Mestizo” identifier.

Second, Richwine asserts that Hispanics share a similar culture that’s distinct from so-called “Anglo” culture. Richwine’s only support for this claim is a citation of Samuel Huntington’s Who Are We?, a book that warns of a wave of Hispanic immigration irrevocably altering American culture for the worse. Huntington’s claims about Hispanic inability to assimilate have been subjected to serious quantitative challenge, but more to the point, citing a polemic tract about immigration does not constitute explaining what the purportedly unified Hispanic culture is and why the fact that it involves a lot of Spanish-speaking and Catholicism might be seen as allowing one to make generalized claims about the group.

This is especially egregious when the scholarly consensus is that there is no obvious unified Hispanic or Latino culture. As the introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Modern Latin American Culture puts it, “as all the chapters [in this book] reveal, any search for a communal ‘Latin American’ culture has remained an elusive, somewhat quixotic idea.” This, again, is because Latin American countries vary widely — compare Mexico to Brazil to Costa Rica to Argentina and find extraordinary differences in wealth, social norms, political systems, and ethnic backgrounds. Indeed, the vast diversity among “Hispanic” societies should be obvious even to someone whose only experience of these cultures involves dining out: Mexican chile rellenos are not Cubano sandwiches, which definitely are not Argentine steak platters.

Finally, Richwine notes that Hispanic immigrants to the United States have a sense of shared identity, but, again, it’s not explained why that allows one to make generalizations about group IQ, let alone the genetic component thereof. It’s just simply asserted, without any explanation of who shares the shared identity — Cuban-Americans, for example, have a different view of their American experience than Salvadoreans — and why that’s relevant.

Why do definitions matter if Richwine succeeds in showing a deep, persistent difference between so-called “Hispanics” and “whites?” Aside from the fact that it makes it impossible to figure out the scope of the dissertation (are Mexicans of largely European descent likely to have low IQs? What about African-descendent Brazilians?), consider a simple analogy. Suppose I test people who like to wear red hats and people who like to wear blue hats, and find the red-hatters have consistently higher IQ scores than blue-hatters. It’s highly unlikely that hat preference itself explains the gap; more likely, it’s something else that’s correlated with being a red-hatter or a blue-hatter or potentially a statistical artifact — a consequence of a few really smart red-hatters or some spectacularly dumb blue-hatters.

Substitute “white” and “Hispanic” and the point becomes clear. Without a proper definition of what he means when he says Hispanic, we have no way of evaluating the role that immigrants’ “Hispanicness” — whether that means shared genes, culture, or national background — plays in determining their IQ. Put differently, in order to know whether and how being Hispanic matters for IQ, we need to know what it means to be Hispanic. That, in turn, makes it impossible to evaluate how meaningful Richwine’s conclusions about the persistence of the IQ gap are or how they apply to any particular group of immigrants.

Someone may disagree with these arguments. But, according to von Vacano, they require a response. Richwine simply pretends they do not exist.

Harvard On The Potomac
After setting off down his research path, Richwine needed to assemble a committee to evaluate his work. Dissertation committees are best thought of as a sort of Venn diagram of expertise. A dissertation is supposed to be original scholarship, work that, once completed, makes its author a leading expert on a very specific topic. No one professor is likely to know as much about every subfield used to get to the candidate’s very specific conclusion, so committee members are supposed to fill in each others’ expertise gaps.

Borjas, as we’ve seen, filled the largest part of the Venn Diagram given his expertise on the economics of Latino immigration. The second committee member, Richard Zeckhauser, is an economic polymath who’s published on an impressively bewildering array of public policy topics. The thread that ties them together is his interest in sophisticated quantitative, economic analysis of public policy issues, making him ideally suited to check Richwine’s complex econometric and statistical work.

There was a consensus among academics I spoke to that the analysis of immigrant IQ test data and other aptitude metrics, as well as his economic model of the effects of low IQ immigration — the quantitative work, essentially — were the best parts of Richwine’s dissertation.

“Jason’s empirical work was careful,” Zeckhauser wrote. “Moreover, my view is that none of his advisors would have accepted his thesis had he thought that his empirical work was tilted or in error. However, Richwine was too eager to extrapolate his empirical results to inferences for policy.” Borjas has made similar remarks, suggesting “none of the members of the committee would have signed off on it if they thought that it was shoddy empirical work.”

With Borjas and Zeckhauser on board, at least one critical area of Richwine’s Venn diagram remained unfilled: race and IQ. And, perhaps unsurprisingly, that’s where the story gets complicated.

Richwine did not do his dissertation research at Harvard. That’s actually fairly common in the Public Policy PhD program. One source familiar with the program told me that students often only have university-provided stipends for the first two and a half years of the program; after that, they work as teaching assistants or find external grants or scholarships to make up the money gap.

That’s when Richwine went off to study at with his “childhood hero” Murray at the American Enterprise Institute. The mechanics of how Richwine ended up with a fellowship at the prestigious conservative think tank aren’t quite clear; Richwine remembers a meeting with Murray in Cambridge leading to his eventual post at AEI, but Murray told me he doesn’t quite recall the process by which Richwine made it to Washington. It doesn’t surprise him, though, that Richwine was thrilled to be at AEI. “I’m Charles Murray,” he said. “I’m sure that Jason wanted to work with me.”

“I mean, come on.”

Murray’s work, particularly The Bell Curve, features prominently in Richwine’s dissertation. Richwine calls Murray “my primary advisor,” noting that “no one was more influential than Charles Murray” on the final product. Steven Durlauf, an economic methodologist at the University of Wisconsin familiar with IQ research, reads this as an acknowledgement that Murray “was de facto the main advisor” in place of Borjas. But even then, Murray didn’t see Richwine in person all that frequently. “I don’t have an office [at AEI]. They pay my salary,” but he generally works remotely.

Murray certainly had more of an influence on Richwine than the student’s third formal advisor, Christopher “Sandy” Jencks. A longtime veteran of the race and IQ wars, Jencks’ position in the controversy is quite different from Murray’s. Unlike Murray, a “hereditarian” who believes genes explain a great deal of the demonstrated gap in IQ scores between black and white students, Jencks is an “environmentalist” who believes circumstances, not genetics, basically explain the score gap.

“My views about both test scores and politics are very different from [Richwine’s],” Jencks told me archly.

Jencks was a “late addition” to the committee, meaning, he clarified, that he didn’t start working on Richwine’s dissertation till after he left for Washington. “He was at AEI at the time,” Jencks said, “so I did not see much of him.” The professor’s role was also fairly limited: “I was asked to serve as a third reader, read a draft, and made extensive comments about what should be done to improve it.” But, as Jencks remembers it, Richwine didn’t heed all of his advice: “He made some of the changes but not others.”

Depending on the importance of these criticisms, this could be a serious problem. “If you’re on the dissertation committee, and you say ‘you’ve gotta change this, this, and this,’ and the student doesn’t do it,” Professor Drezner told me, “then that is a red flag.”

Jencks didn’t clarify exactly what his criticisms were. But independent review of the section on race and IQ suggested some serious problems with Richwine’s approach.

IQ Isn’t Everything (Or Even Close)
“No academic institution would hire him based on this,” said Professor Warigia Bowman.

Bowman graduated from the Kennedy School Public Policy PhD program in the same year that Richwine did. She knew all of his advisors, some quite well: she was Borjas’ teaching fellow in an introductory economics course, studied analytic methods with Zeckhauser, and had encountered Jencks in passing. Bowman has the utmost respect for all of them.

“They’re extremely generous people, they’ve always been kind to me…they’re known internationally as academic scholars.”

But she thinks that, in this case, they missed some serious errors. “I can only imagine that they were so dazzled by the empirics that they overlooked many of the flaws in the text.” Essentially, the quality of mathematical and statistical analysis in Richwine’s work hid some major conceptual shortcomings in his treatment of IQ.

Bowman, now an Assistant Professor at the University of Arkansas’ Clinton School of Public Service who specializes in African Science and Technology policy, is close to this debate. An attorney as well as a scholar, she worked on immigration law before becoming an academic. She’s also, in her words, “an African-American woman who’s the child of an immigrant of African descent.”

Her basic point is that Richwine’s treatment of his opponents, particularly critics of Murray’s work, is “selective, narrow, and cherry-picked.” For instance, she notes, Richwine cites a 1996 American Psychological Association (APA) report called Intelligence: Knowns and Unknowns as representative of a “general consensus” about the “fundamentals” of IQ, but fails to cite or respond to subsequent criticism of the APA report by relevant experts.

This is a particularly troubling omission. Professor Diane F. Halpern is the only person to have coauthored both the 1996 report and a 2012 paper attempting to revise its conclusions to reflect the last 15 years of research on intelligence. Halpern isn’t a stranger to taking controversial positions on genes and intelligence: in her book “Sex Differences and Cognitive Abilities,” she wrote that there is “good evidence that biological sex differences play a role in establishing and maintaining cognitive sex differences.”

Yet recent research has swayed her in the opposite direction on the biology of intelligence. “It seems safe to conclude that low socioeconomic status limits genetic contributions to intelligence, which means that poor children do not develop their full genetic potential,” she wrote, “a finding that took me some time to accept and understand.”

Some of the most persuasive research supporting this new consensus comes from Professor Eric Turkheimer. Turkheimer and his colleagues conducted several analyses of data on twins, perhaps most famously in a 2003 study that analyzed twin performance on IQ tests using a model that separated out genetic and environmental differences inside and between pairs and then mapped the results onto the soci-economic status of the children. Turkheimer and company found that among poor twins, virtually no variation in IQ could be attributed to inherited traits, but among wealthier ones, a significant portion was. This suggests that poverty and material deprivation uniquely overwhelm any genetic component to IQ, artificially depressing IQ among disadvantaged children. Turkheimer’s research is supported by a wealth of direct evidence about the way in which stress and pollution in early childhood can stunt brain development.

Richwine doesn’t cite Turkheimer’s research. Though he’s forced to concede that similar work has demonstrated “environmental factors significantly affect IQ development when the environment is dire,” he dismisses this potentially damning critique of his persistent IQ gap — after all, most Hispanic immigrants to the United States are from far poorer countries — by saying there’s nothing you can do to fix a damaged IQ. Citing Murray and several other “hereditarian scholars, he suggests that all interventions to raise IQ have been proven to have no meaningful long term effects.

“That’s mistaken,” says Professor Richard Nisbett.

Nisbett is one of the world’s leading experts on intelligence. A co-author of the “new consensus” paper with Halpern, he’s well positioned to comment on the academic appropriateness of Richwine’s omissions (Richwine wrote a strident, but genial, critique of Nisbett’s 2009 book. Nisbett appeared unaware of this review until I mentioned it after our substantive conversation).

Nisbett believes the evidence amassed in recent years that IQ can be improved is overwhelming. “There are lots of interventions for very young children that increase IQ enormously,” he says. Though “the gains [in IQ test results] typically fade,” as Richwine suggests, “the very best interventions [to improve IQ] have colossal effects” for the rest of a child’s life.

He rattled off an impressive list of findings: these interventions “reduce by half the likelihood of being put back a grade in school…they increase the likelihood of graduating high school by about 20 percent, and they increase the likelihood of four year college by a factor of three. They increase the likelihood of making over two thousand dollars a month by a factor of four and they reduce by half the likelihood of being on welfare as an adult.” So even if the scores on IQ tests don’t change all that much down the line, the benefit of raising IQ scores at the right time in a child’s life appears to be enormous.

So a deep body of work since 1995 suggests IQ either is being raised permanently by these interventions in a way that isn’t showing up on tests, or IQ doesn’t matter nearly as much as Richwine thinks. But instead of grappling with this work, which obviously presents a serious challenge to his core thesis that “new Hispanic immigrants will have low-IQ children,” Richwine is mostly content to outsource his conclusion to Charles Murray’s view circa 1994.

But what about Richwine’s dire warnings about an America plagued by an influx of low-IQ people? Richwine blames low IQ for everything from high crime rates among young “Hispanics” to increased rates of social distrust between Americans to labor market disruptions. In one particularly cringe inducing section, he posits that the reason for Hispanic “underclass” poverty is a combination of welfare-induced laziness (a point he takes as given, citing only Murray in support and no dissenting views) and low IQ.

Showing that low IQ immigration would be likely to have any one of those consequences would be a difficult scholarly accomplishment, but Richwine’s seeming ambition to make a comprehensive case against mass immigration proved his undoing. In prioritizing breadth over depth, Richwine skated over a wealth of research throwing up a significant roadblock for his conclusions: the question of how much IQ matters for life outcomes.

On the basis of several relatively crude correlations, Richwine treats a person’s IQ as an almost-perfect guide to someone’s prospects for success in life, relying heavily, once again, on Murray’s work in The Bell Curve. While it’s clear that the sort of intelligence IQ measures matters, particularly when you’re comparing two people from similar backgrounds (the higher IQ sibling in a pair, for example, is likely to do better), there’s simply no reason to think IQ matters enough to provide the juice for sweeping theories about the life prospects of entire groups of immigrants.

“There was no excuse for saying that kind of thing in 2009,” Nisbett said.

James Heckman would likely agree. Professor Heckman, an eminent economist at the University of Chicago who worked with Borjas when he was a post-doctoral fellow there, is an expert on the role that intelligence and other traits play in helping people succeed. He wrote a paper with Tim Kautz last year called, “Hard Evidence of Soft Skills,” reviewing the last several decades of research on the topic. As you might guess from the title, it’s not good for Richwine.

Experts generally think that, roughly, a “Big Five” set of psychological traits — Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism — are key predictors of how well someone will do in life in terms of income, college graduation and so on. These traits can matter as much or more than IQ on some measures: a 2006 paper by Heckman and others found that personality tests were, statistically speaking, better predictors of career choice, criminality, and teen pregnancy (among other important things) than “cognitive” metrics like IQ scores.

These findings make intuitive sense. No matter how good your brain is at crunching numbers, you can still make bad choices if you’re lazy, anti-social, or overly neurotic. Conversely, people who work hard and well with others don’t have to be cognitive geniuses to succeed. As Nisbett told me, “there are prominent people with IQs in the 90s.”

The research on personality helps explain a puzzle I raised earlier: why do early childhood interventions, as Nisbett says, appear to improve children’s chances in life over the long term while only providing a temporary boost in IQ scores? As it turns out, you can teach kids to work harder or get along better with others. Heckman summarizes a number of studies to make this point, but perhaps the clearest were two studies where children were tasked with accomplishing a series of attention-heavy computer tests. They found higher conscientiousness scores among the kids who were given these tasks than a control group. Once again, more advantaged, better educated kids have a huge leg up.


On the basis of this research, Heckman finds Richwine’s attempt to use IQ to predict the consequences of Hispanic immigration beyond outdated. “Hispanics have an amazing work ethic…and they are achievement oriented,” Heckman wrote, in a statement that admittedly smacks of some stereotyping of its own. Richwine’s argument “sounds like a worn out restatement of eugenics from 100 years ago.”

Heckman’s view is and has been the dominant one for quite some time. “IQ fundamentalists,” a term Nisbett steals from Malcolm Gladwell, just are “not well informed” about what most economists and psychologists think about habits of mind and personality that make people succeed. They operate out of “a silo,” the same one from which Jason Richwine took the grain he used to make his meal.

These critiques hardly exhaust the criticisms one could level at Richwine’s treatment of Hispanics and IQ. We could get into the fact that Richwine posits a partially-genetically lower Hispanic IQ despite the fact that there’s not a single study of the role genes play in “Hispanic” IQ scores, let alone one that supports Richwine’s theory. We could get into the fact that his samples of Hispanic immigrants are rather small, leading him to supplement with national-level estimations of Hispanic IQ — principally from Richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhanen — that rely on small, outdated, and culturally biased datasets that oftentimes aren’t even from the relevant country, divined instead from the “known IQs” of a country’s “racial groups.” And even that terrible data, according to The American Conservative publisher Ron Unz, doesn’t itself support the idea that Hispanics have lower IQs.

But the point is clear enough. Whether or not you think Richwine’s conclusions about Hispanics and IQ are defensible — and the relevant research suggests that they are not — it’s clear that he didn’t defend them well enough.

Beyond Richwine
Richwine finished his dissertation in his fourth year at Harvard, while he was working out of AEI. That’s not unheard of, but it’s faster than the Kennedy School average. “It can be done with some sacrifice to quality or depth,” one Kennedy School alum told me.

There were ample opportunities to revise his conclusions, beyond the normal give-and-take advising process Borjas described when we corresponded about Richwine. All Kennedy School Public Policy PhD students are given a chance to revise a full draft of the dissertation before final approval; in some instances, one source familiar with the process told me, they get “sent back to the drawing board.”

It’s unclear what happened at this stage. Richwine could not be reached for comment, and his professors won’t say. “I feel extremely uncomfortable disclosing personal and critical advice that I gave Jason or any other student in the privacy of my office,” Borjas said.

But here’s what we do know. Jason Richwine received a PhD from Harvard University for sub-standard research, work that makes strong assertions on a charged topic based on poorly defined concepts, incomplete and misleading summaries of opposing arguments, and bald analytic overreaches.

Is this enough to say Harvard was wrong to award him his dissertation? While some, like von Vacano, say yes, others urge more caution. Professor Durlauf, for one, says “the dissertation committee members should be presumed to have acted in good faith.”

There’s no reason to believe they didn’t. Every independent expert who wanted to speak on the topic praised the program. “Harvard’s Kennedy School is a very serious place and has trained some outstanding scholars,” said Professor Dan Black at the University of Chicago. “I hold their Ph.D. program in very high regard.”

The same went for his committee members. Even those harshly critical of Richwine’s dissertation agreed they were kind people and highly-regarded scholars.

And as for Richwine, the overwhelming sense you get from reading his work and speaking to his acquaintances is that he was, as odd as this sounds, a well-intentioned naïf. We’ve all met the type: someone so airily focused on their own passions and interests (in Richwine’s case, Murray-style hereditarian work on race and IQ) that they miss the broader social forest for the trees.

“I think what happened was that he tried to make an academic argument but did not foresee this [racism] problem,” his friend, Professor Tran, told me.

Whatever one thinks about Harvard or Richwine, the real lesson here goes beyond both of them.

Even if Richwine’s dissertation, despite all of its errors and omissions, was “good enough” to earn a passing mark, it’s emphatically not “good enough” to make a real contribution to our knowledge about the intersection between race and IQ. The scholarly errors in his research are too pervasive and severe.

Beyond the failure of craft, however, is the serious harm that can result from quasi-eugenic works masquerading as serious research. Alleging that, as a group, an enormous percentage of Americans are and always will be dumber than their fellow citizens isn’t just normal academic inquiry. Richwine bemoans the lack of “social trust” purportedly created by American diversity, but few things could undermine the shared bonds of citizenship more than widespread belief among one “race” that others are so unintelligent that more of them can [sic] be let into the country.

This isn’t a theoretical point. Throughout American history, the so-called science of race and IQ has been used by the powerful to demarcate “good” citizens and separate them from the “dangerous” ones. Minorities and minority immigrants in particular have borne the brunt of these attacks, as Ta-Nehisi Coates demonstrates by simply quoting the words of anti-immigrant advocates against themselves. Much as Richwine may sound like a disinterested scholar, his work does not occur in a political or social vacuum. His own policy recommendations to limit immigration to high-IQ individuals proves it.

It is the case that, on some tests of intelligence, there are demonstrated gaps between different groups of Americans, particularly ones identified as “black” and “white.” As we’ve seen, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests these broad groups have little do with “race” simpliciter and much more to do with the environments people of certain races find themselves in. These findings underscore that careful scholarship on the sources of this gap, like Richard Nisbett’s or Christopher Jencks’, is legitimate academic inquiry and should be vigorously protected as such.

But this field is no place for dilettantes. The costs of being wrong are too high, the fearful forces fueled too powerful for race and IQ research to be judged like normal work. There needs to be a premium on conceptual precision and empirical accuracy over and above standard operating procedure, even (or perhaps especially) at a place as esteemed as Harvard. Anyone who wants to work in this area should be set to a higher standard, asked to explain what “race” means and whether it’s really what matters when we talk about IQ. It’s a bar Jason Richwine’s simplistic research never would have cleared.

Sometimes, “good enough” isn’t good enough.



http://www.businessdictionary.com/article/974/ethnicity-vs-race-d1113/
Ethnicity vs. Race
By: Jeffrey Glen

The concepts of ethnicity and race are two that are very often confused by individuals and even in public media.

Race refers to physical attributes and appearances, so things like skin color, hair color, and bone structure. So this is what is being described when you listen to concepts like Caucasian, Asian, African American. Even these descriptions are somewhat confusing when you consider them in terms of ethnicity.

Ethnicity refers to cultural factors such as nationality, culture, language and beliefs. So in this case someone could be considered ethnically American, or ethnically American and English speaker. This overlaps quite a bit when you consider a race grouping like Asian, which actually has so many ethnic groups one would struggle to name even half.

Usage of the two is commonly confused in public discourse and media leading many to not clearly understand the distinctions discussed above. When you hear something in the media like, "The American race," there is really no such thing.

The best way to keep them straight is to remember that race is physical while ethnicity is well... .everything else.

There have been many laws created to minimize discrimination based on race and ethnicity in the workplace. One of the first laws in place to eliminate workplace discrimination was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This act made it unlawful to discriminate based on race, religion, sex, or national origin. There have been many more laws created since 1964 and these laws are enforced by the Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC).



FASCISM ON CAMPUS

https://www.pressherald.com/2018/06/29/white-supremacist-propaganda-turning-up-on-campuses/
NATION & WORLD Posted June 29 Updated June 29
White supremacist propaganda turning up on campuses
The Anti-Defamation League finds 292 occurrences in the District of Columbia and 47 states.
BY ERIN B. LOGAN THE WASHINGTON POST

“Not Stolen. Conquered,” a flier found in a music building at San Diego State University read. “Your professor is scared of this book,” read a sticker outside a building at New York’s Baruch College, referring to a work by white nationalist Jared Taylor.

White supremacist propaganda on college campuses is on the rise, according to a report by the Anti-Defamation League. The nonprofit found 292 occurrences on campuses located in the District of Columbia and 47 states, a 77 percent increase compared with the 2016-2017 school year. The ADL relied on news reports, community complaints and extremist sources to complete the report, according to Oren Segal, director of the group’s Center on Extremism.

The propaganda typically appeared on stickers, posters, banners and fliers, and it varied from “veiled white supremacist language to explicitly racist images and words that attack minority groups, including Jews, Blacks, Muslims, non-white immigrants, and the LGBTQ community,” the report said.

“College campuses and their communities should be places for learning, growing and the future, not close-minded racism and hate-filled rhetoric from the past,” the ADL’s national director, Jonathan Greenblatt, said in a statement. “We’re concerned to see that white supremacists are accelerating their efforts to target schools with propaganda in hopes of recruiting young people to support their bigoted worldview.”

The report highlighted Identity Evropa, an organization founded in 2016 that recruits college-aged people though banners, stickers and online propaganda.

The group was responsible for 48 percent of reported incidents in the past two years, the report found. In January, members posted fliers over historically significant African American images outside the black studies department at the University of South Carolina at Columbia, the report said.

“The ADL is clearly reporting in error or negligence, as the blanket allegations reflect neither Identity Evropa nor any statement from a current representative,” group spokesman Sam Harrington said in an email. Harrington noted the group is “seeking a better future for European Americans” and does not advocate for “supremacy, violence or illegal activity.”

“The ADL, and organizations like it, are attempting to stifle free debate and will continue to lose trust with the thinking public,” he said.

The ADL describes Identity Evropa as a white supremacist group that avoids recognizable language and imagery on its symbols in an attempt to enter mainstream conservatism.

Members were present at this year’s Conservative Political Action Conference and last year’s Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville. The night before the protest turned deadly, participants chanted their popular mantra, “you will not replace us.” The chant, Harrington said, references people “who believe there is something to be gained from demographically replacing European Americans through immigration and globalization.”